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FOR SOME TIME, economists have argued that a variety of factors can obstruct a 
rapid pace of economic development. I Scarcities of capital, a skilled and disci-
plined labour force, entrepreneurial talent, foreign exchange and industrial raw ma-
terials have been mentioned, among the prominent obstacles to growth in unde-
veloped countries. Lack of adequate energy supply is now being added as a factor 
explaining the slow pace of growth in these countries. For a large number of less 
developed countries have to depend on imported sources of energy; the high for-
eign exchange bills, resulting from rapidly rising prices, are simply beyond their 
means. Pakistan is a good case in point.' 
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether investment in energy and in-
creased domestic production of energy increased the rate of economic growth in 
Pakistan during the 1980s. The analysis that follows focuses on the following two 
questions. 
(a) (through the use of comparative cross-sectional data) How did Pa-
kistan compare with other countries in its energy efforts and what 
were the consequences of this for growth in the 1980s? 
(b) Did energy investment in Pakistan initiate an expansion in the 
country's economy or was it simply a response to the need created 
by that growth? 
The author is from the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, US. 
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Background 
There is rapidly expanding anecdotal literature describing the problems as-
sociated with energy shortages in Pakistan.2 In fact, the 1980s witnessed a major 
increase in the frequency and intensity of power outages, especially in the indus-
trial sector. These outages appeared to be localised in two provinces: the Punjab 
and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). '!bis led to complaints, by the vari-
ous chambers of commerce and industry and other industrial associations in the 
country, that the level of production in a number of industries had been reduced by 
a factor of about a quarter to a third, due to the persistence of outages that appar-
ently had fundamentally disturbed the normal rhythm of the production cycle in a 
large number of industrial units. 
Writing in 1981, Ebinger3 noted: 
Pakistan exemplifies the energy policy-planning dilemma. Despite con-
siderable opportunities, the nation has failed to develop the power-
generating capability that could alleviate its most pressing energy prob-
lems. The failure to achieve success has been costly: industrial output 
has remained low and agricultural growth, while improving during 
1979-80, has, in general, failed to keep pace with the growth of popu-
lation. Failure to bring electric power to large areas of the countryside 
has led to an increased reliance on non-fossil fuels (wood bagasse, cot-
ton sticks, dung), with serious damage to the environment: the rapid in-
crease in the siltation rate in the Indus and Kabul Rivers is but one 
example. Finally, the continued lack of electric power distribution in 
Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province has exacerbated long-
standing economic grievances against the Sindhi and Punjabi industrial 
and agricultural elites and has increased the already pronounced sepa-
ratist tendencies of these two provinces, with potentially serious effects 
on the national integration of Pakistan. 
Infrastructural constraints, especially in electric power generation and trans-
port, have remained a major factor preventing the manufacturing sector from attain-
ing its full potential in the economy. While transport facilities have remained poor 
and inadequate, energy supplies have also fallen short of demand. One study4 found 
that, while outage costs in the industrial sector were not as high as claimed by some 
industrial associations in the country, they were still large enough (about 1.8 per 
cent of gross domestic product) to warrant an expanded programme of investment 
in energy generation in the medium run and the pursuit of a loss-minimising load 
management strategy and pricing policy in the short run. 
Energy consumption levels in Pakistan have been much lower, even relative 
to other less developed countries. Thus, while the average per capita consumption 
of oil equivalent commercial energy in low-idcome economies was 322 kg in 1988, 
it was 210 kg in Pakistan (the corresponding levels in Bangladesh, India and Sri 
Lanka were 50, 211 and 162 respectively).5 
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Limited public funds for development in the country have also created a di-
chotomy in both transport and energy, with modem transport modes and depen-
dence on commercial energy in urban areas (including industrial townships) 
· coexisting with extensive use of traditional fuels and vehicles in villages and back-
ward locations. At the same time, given the high rates of population growth, pres-
sures on existing infrastructural facilities have been emerging rapidly. Augmentation 
of supply of traditional forms has only been possible at a slow pace. On the other 
hand, for commercial urban utilities, the lack of internal generation of resources 
has hampered self-sustaining expansion. Another conspicuous feature common to 
Pakistan and the other South Asian countries has been their high dependence on 
crude oil and petroleum imports. 6 
In Pakistan, commercial energy consumption, by decreasing order of impor-
tance, is oil (40 per cent), gas (33 per cent), hydroelectricity (22 per cent) and nu-
clear (five per cent). Existing development plans have addressed the problem of 
inadequate energy availability, and the strategic approach to this sector includes: 7 
1. an intensification of the search for fresh indigenous sources; 
2. the development of nuclear energy; 
3. arranging inter-fuel adjustments; 
4. intervention through market forces, by altering relative energy 
prices; and 
5. encouraging participation by the private sector, as well as foreign 
investors. 
Pakistan's commercially exploitable energy resources consist of hydropower, 
natural gas, oil and coal. Despite the country's good endowment of energy re-
sources, its dependence on energy imports (crude oil and oil products) has been in-
creasing because of under-utilisation of domestic resources. At the same time, as 
noted above, energy shortages (mainly power) have continued. During the last 
decade, the Fifth and Sixth Plans targets emphasised the accelerated development 
of domestic energy resources, but financial and implementation constraints im-
peded the achievement of these targets. New targets for the next 20 years (to the 
year 2010) were set in the Long-Term Energy Strategy (LES) prepared in the late 
1980s, but implementation of this new set of targets is already behind schedule. 
This is due to the limited availability of funds for public in~estment and, most im-
portantly, because the expected increase in private sector investment has not taken 
place. 
Shortages in hydropower generation have led to a more rapid development of 
thermal generation capacity. The latter has lower investment costs and shorter ges-
t;ation periods, but results in higher operational costs and increased pressure on the 
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Table 1 
Developing countries: major structural and performance patterns 
factor loadings 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Growth Growth Public/debt 
1970s 1980s expenditure Size 
Variable 
Investment growth 70-80 0.90* 0.07 --0.11 0.05 
Import growth 65-80 0.90* --0.05 0.06 0.08 
GDP growth 70-80 0.86* 0.25 --0.01 --0.04 
Energy consumption growth 65-80 0.78* --0.15 0.06 --0.03 
Share of investment in GDP 1980 0.67* --0.01 0.45 0.03 
Public consumption growth 70-80 0.66* --0.12 0.39 0.09 
Energy consumption growth 80--88 0.62* 0.44 --0.19 0.11 
Agriculture growth 70-80 0.47 0.25 --0.21 --0.14 
Investment growth 80-88 --0.20 0.83* --0.05 --0.03 
GDP growth 80-88 0.32 0.80* --0.01 0.08 
Import growth 80--88 --0.24 0.77* 0.09 --0.11 
Public consumption growth 0.09 0.61* --0.09 0.21 
Investment/GDP 88 0.26 0.46 0.38 0.10 
Debt/GDP 88 --0.27 --0.44 0.31 --0.25 
Debt service/GDP 88 0.15 --0.01 0.80* --0.14 
Exports/GDP 88 0.02 0.19 0.73* --0.38 
Non-military public expenditure 80--88** --0.07 --0.05 0.69* 0.04 
Debt service/GDP 80 --0.14 --0.16 0.76* 0.03 
Agriculture growth 80-88 0.16 0.24 0.26 0.18 
Average GDP 80--88 0.12 0.15 0.04 0.91* 
Area 88 --0.05 --Q;ll --0.05 0.89* 
Average population 80-88 ;-0.02 0.26 --0.12 0.69* 
Eigen Value 5.27 3.47 2.70 2.15 
Notes: 
Orthogonally rotated factor matrix computed using SPSS/PC+ 4.0. 
Economic data from: World Bank, World Development Report, 1990, 1982 (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press). 
Non-military government expenditure from the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1989 (Washington: USACDA, 1990). 
**Average value over the 1980-88 period. 
balance of payments, as, at the margin, fuel is imported. In financial year 1988, 
thermal generation accounted for 57 per cent of total power generation. 
Almost half the thermal generation is oil-based, due to the failure to expand 
the use of domestic coal and gas for thermal generation. Pricing, political and tech-
nical issues have hampered private investment in both coal-mining and coal-based 
power generation, while gas availability has remained below demand levels, with 
some consumers benefiting from subsidised prices well below those of comparable 
energy sources. In the coal sector, difficulties may continue, as the financial and 
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economic viability of the main coal deposits to be used for power generation has 
not yet proved sufficient to attract private investment. 
As a result of these developments, the growth rate of energy consumption 
· (8.3 per cent per annum in 1984-89) has exceeded the increase in supply (7.2 per 
cent per annum) and the energy gap has been increasing, resulting in continued 
load-shedding and the need for inefficient investment in back-up oil-powered 
generators. 
During 1987 /88, both oil and gas production rose by about nine per cent, 
while power generation registered a more impressive growth rate of about 14 per 
cent. Electricity supplies remained inadequate and this was reflected mainly in un-
satisfied demand of small-scale industries and of farmers for operating tube-wells. 
The energy policy, therefore, also stressed the progressive development of renew-
able sources of energy, with the emphasis on tapping alternative sources, such as 
solar and wind. 8 
In sum, the main issues facing the energy sector include: (a) low investment 
by both the public and private sectors; (b) inadequate pricing policies, which led to 
excessive demand for some types of energy and financial difficulties for the com-
panies; (c) excessive use of imported ·oil and under-development of domestic en-
ergy resources; and (d) political and institutional issues, which have delayed the 
implementation of large investments (e.g. the Kalabagh Dam). 
If energy has been such a binding constraint on growth, the high rates of pub~ 
lie investment in the 1970s (together with the corresponding expansion of energy 
production) should have been a major factor contributing to the economy's rapid 
growth in the 1980s. To test this thesis, the following sections attempt to quantify 
the role played by energy in the country's recent economic performance. 
Cross-country comparisons 
To gain some sense of the relationships between energy and the economy, a 
sample of 104 developing countries was examined for the periods 1970-80 and 
1980-88 (for some variables, 1965-90). Our initial thesis is that countries, which 
were capable of expanding e~ergy production in the 1970s, should, ceteris paribus, 
have experienced relatively higher growth in output during the 1980s. Because a 
large number of development indices are correlated with one another, an initial fac-
tor analysis9 was undertaken, to determine the main structural/performance trends 
during this period. These variables consisted largely of various measures of energy 
consumption, economic growth in the 1970s and 1980s, the debt situation, govern-
ment expenditure and population, and overall economic size. This analysis pro-
duced four major trends (factors) (table 1): 
1. The dominant factor consisted of various measures of growth in the 
1970s. Clearly a number of variables were closely correlated with 
overall GDP growth, including: investment growth, imports, energy 
consumption and, to a lesser extent, agricultural growth. 
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Table 2 
Developing countries: major structural and performance patterns 
factor scores 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Growth Growth Public/debt 
1970s 1980s expenditure Size 
Pakistan --0.57 1.79 --0.71 0.21 
India --0.63 1.60 --0.79 3.67 
Ethiopia -1.33 0.47 --0.93 --0.15 
Malawi --0.10 --0.44 --0.07 --0.50 
Somalia 0.50 --0.50 --0.69 --0.38 
Zaire -1.66 0.47 --0.12 0.24 
Madagascar -1.34 --0.69 0.26 --0.48 
Mali --0.20 0.25 --0.86 --0.46 
Burundi --0.15 1.08 -1.17 --0.55 
Nigeria 1.56 -2.26 --0.70 0.14 
Zambia -1.61 -1.02 0.94 -1.23 
Niger 0.05 -1.55 --0.41 0.17 
Kenya --0.10 0.41 0.03 --0.33 
Togo 0.05 --0.67 1.84 --0.05 
Central African Republic -1.61 0.68 -1.24 --0.61 
Ghana -1.71 --0.23 -1.07 --0.51 
Indonesia 1.09 0.41 0.40 0.71 
Mauritania 0.09 -1.14 2.39 --0.47 
Sudan --0.74 -1.07 -1.68 0.24 
Bolivia --0.15 -2.21 --0.53 --0.26 
Philippines 0.32 --0.82 --0.35 --0.31 
Yemen Arab Republic 3.26 --0.69 --0.91 --0.34 
Senegal --0.74 0.17 0.22 --0.54 
Dominican Republic 0.24 0.51 --0.33 --0.97 
Morocco 0.20 0.64 1.10 0.08 
Honduras --0.02 --0.07 --0.02 --0.47 
El Salvador --0.35 --0.32 -1.51 --0.72 
Thailand 0.64 1.71 --0.05 --0.33 
Cameroon 0.30 0.97 --0.66 --0.31 
Jamaica -1.68 --0.40 2.62 --0.54 
Colombia 0.20 0.22 --0.57 --0.07 
Paraguay 1.05 0.62 --0.88 --0.84 
Tunisia 0.99 0.11 1.06 --0.60 
Turkey 0.44 1.51 0.12 --0.11 
Peru --0.75 --0.44 --0.20 0.54 
Chile --0.90 --0.22 0.37 --0.26 
Syria 1.76 --0.89 -1.00 --0.52 
Costa Rica 0.16 0.41 0.51 --0.75 
Mexico 0.24 --0.92 0.43 1.43 
Malaysia 0.67 1.11 1.81 --0.79 
Brazil 0.23 --0.32 0.29 4.42 
Algeria 1.42 0.06 1.69 1.01 
Argentina --0.28 -1.38 --0.53 1.13 
Yugoslavia 0.40 0.33 --0.35 --0.20 
Korea 1.24 2.44 0.40 --0.05 
Portugal --0.43 0.37 1.43 --0.22 
Greece --0.70 • --0.08 0.37 --0.16 
Note: derived from data in table 1. 
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Interestingly, energy consumption in the 1980s was more 
closely associated with the pattern of growth in the 1970s than it 
was with the various measures of economic expansion in the 
1980s. 
2. The second major trend was growth in the 1980s. This growth 
was suppressed somewhat by the build-up of external debt, but 
the loading of -0 .44 was not a major factor reducing the expan-
sion during this period. Overall growth in the 1980s appeared 
much less tied to agricultural expansion than it was in the 1970s. 
3. The third major dimension of the data consists of several mea-
sures of debt and government expenditure. 
4. Overall economic size was the final major structural patteJ,"n. 
Here, size was a weighted average of the average GDP and popu-
lation in the 1980s, together with country area. 
The factor scores (table 2) provide measures of the relative degree to which 
each country ranked on each dimension. Pakistan ranked (Factor 2 score = 1. 79 
[O is the mean]) especially high, in terms of growth in the 1980s - that is, the 
country's performance during this period was considerably above that of other de-
veloping countries. Its growth performance in the 1970s was, however, lower than 
the norm. 
As noted, Pakistan clearly fell into the high-growth category during the 
1980s. To determine the possible role of energy in contributing to this growth, our 
sample of countries was further analysed, using discriminant analysis. IO Specifi-
cally, we are interested in determining the extent to which growth in the 1980s 
could have been predicted, given the development of domestic energy supplies in 
the 1970s. For this purpose, a number of energy, growth and structural variables 
(table 3) were introduced as possible discriminating variables. The initial grouping 
was based on the factor scores for Factor 2 above - the growth rates in the 1980s. 
Those countries with a score less than zero were classed as the low-growth group 
of countries. Correspondingly, those countries with a Factor 2 score of zero and 
greater were classified in the high-growth group. 
An examination of the means of these two groups provides some interesting 
contrasts: 
1. Both groups of countries experienced roughly comparable increases 
in energy production after the 1973-74 energy crisis. However, the 
low-growth group had somewhat higher rates of energy production 
over the 1965-80 period as a whole. Still, energy consumption was 
higher in the high-growth countries'(but still less than the expansion 
of energy production). Per capita energy consumption in 1970 was 
considerably higher in the low-growth countries. 
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Table 3 
Predictors of growth performance in the 1980s 
Variables in discriminant analysis 
Energy 
Energy production 1974n9 
Energy production 1965/80 
Energy consumption 1965/80 
Energy consumption 197 4n9 




Public consumption 1970/80 








Incremental capital output ratio 1970/80 
Incremental capital output ratio 1965/80 
Savings/GDP 1980 
Exports/GDP 1980 
Long-term debt service/exports 1980 






















Statistically significant descriminating variables 
GDP growth 1970-80 
Investment growth 1970-80 
Energy production 1965-80 
Energy consumption per capita 1979 
Long-term debt service/exports 1980 
Industrial growth 1970-80 
Mean values 
Growth groups 1980s 
Wilks' Lambda Low High 
0.81 3.8 6.0 
0.74 3.5 6.5 
0.64 13.3 10.8 
0.56 908.2 619.2 
0.52 16.2 11.2 
0.50 4.0 7.1 
Notes: Based on stepwise discriminant analysis, using SPSS/PC+ 4.0. 
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Economic data from: World Bank, World Development Report, 1990, 1982 (New 
York: Oxford University Press). 
Non-military government expenditurefrorA the United States Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1989 (Wash-
ington: USACDA, 1990). 
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2. As one might imagine, the countries achieving above-average 
growth in the 1980s also had superior growth performance in the 
previous decade. This was especially the case for investment (6.5 
versus 3.6 per cent annual average growth during the 1970s) and 
industrial growth (7 .1 versus 4.0). · 
3. The high-growth countries also had pigher shares (of GDP in 1980) 
of investment and savings, together with lower debt burdens at the 
beginning of the 1980s. 
Of these variables, six were found to be statistically significant in splitting 
the total sample into two groups: (a) GDP and investment growth in the 1980s 
were the most important; followed by (b) energy production in 1965-80; (c) energy-
consumption per capita in 1979; (d) long-term debt service to exports in 1980; and 
( e) the growth of industrial production in the 1970s. 
An examination of the corresponding discriminant scores and probability of 
group classification (table 4) indicates that these six variables predicted growth in 
the 1980s with a high degree of accuracy. In terms of their actual performance in 
the 1980s, only three countries - India, The Philippines and El Salvador - were 
incorrectly grouped. Pakistan's growth performance was predicted with a probabil-
ity of 92 per cent. 
To summarise: from the perspective of 1980, it appears to be possible to have 
predicted the overall economic performance of developing countries in the 1980s 
with a high degree of accuracy. For the purposes of this study, however, national 
efforts toward increasing energy production do not appear to have been a critical 
element in separating high from low-growth countries. The high-growth countries 
of the 1980s do not appear to have made a special effort in the 1970s to increase 
their energy capacity. 
To test this finding, a further series of multiple regressions was performed on 
the total sample of countries and on several sub-groupings. The growth model esti-
mated had the form: 
GDP= f[I, 1-1, EP-1, EP] 
where: 
GDP = the growth in GDP, 1980-88 
I = the growth in investment, 1980-88 
I - 1 = the growth in investment, 1970-80 
EP - 1 = the growth in energy production, 1965-80 
EP = the growth in energy production, 1980-88 
That is, after controlling for the ml\ior sources of growth, investment and 
lagged investment 11 tests were performed, to assess the possible impact of energy 
production on overall economic growth in the 1980s. 
Summer 1995 157 
Table4 









































































































































































































Notes: Based on stepwise discriminant analysis, using SPSS/PC+ 4.0. 
Economic data from: World Bank, World Development Report, 1990, 1982 (New York: Oxford · 
University Press). • 
Non-military government expenditure from the United States Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1989 (Washington: USACDA, 1990). 
*Incorrect prediction. 
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For the sample as a whole (table 5): 
1. Investment during 198~8 accounted for slightly more than 47 per 
cent of the observed variation in developing country growth rates 
during that period. However, investment during the 1970s did not 
significantly accelerate growth performance in the next decade. 
2. Energy production in the 1970s did not contribute to growth in the 
1980s. However, energy production in the 1980s was statistically 
significant in expanding growth. 
3. Pakistan grew at an annual average rate of 6.5 per cent per annum 
during 1980-88. The estimated model, however, anticipated that 
the country would have grown at a rate of 4.3 per cent. 
·-Dropping the countries with very poor growth performance in the 1980s 
(those with a Factor 2 score of -1.5 or less, table 6) resulted in lagged investment 
now becoming significant. On the other hand, energy production in the 1980s was 
no longer statistically significant in contributing to growth in the 1980s. 
Lagged investment continued to be strengthened and energy production less-
ened in their contribution to growth in the 1980s, as more and more lower-growth 
countries were dropped from the sample (tables 7 and 8). 
Finally, by the time only the high-growth group of countries was left in the 
sample - countries with a Factor 2 score of more than zero (table 9): 
1. Both current and lagged investment were about equally important in 
contributing to growth in the 1980s. That is, countries· that grew 
above the norm in the 1980s were those able to maintain fairly high 
rates of investment over the period 197~8. 
2. Energy production does not appear to have contributed to above-
normal economic performance in the 1980s. That is, countries, 
which increased their energy production relative to other countries, 
did not have corresponding growth rates to show for this effort. 
3. When examined in the context of high-growth countries, investment 
(current plus past) explained only about one-third of Pakistan's 
growth during 1980-88. That is, as Pakistan was examined in the 
context of a group of countries comprising an increasing proportion 
of high-growth countries, the percentage of its growth explained by 
investment declined. 
This final point lends support to the argument that much of Pakistan's growth 
in the 1980s simply reflects the depletion of capital stock, rather than the increased 
efficiency of existing capital. 
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Table 5 
Developing countries: sources of growth, 1980-88 
standardised regression coefficients 
(1) GDP= 0.691(80/88) 
(7.20)*** 
Total country sample 
df= 57; R2(adj) =0.476; F= 51.81 
(2) GDP = 0.69 1(80/88) + 0.17 1(70/80) 
(7 .23)*** ( 1. 78)* 
df = 56; R2(adj) = 0.486; F = 28.48 
(3) GDP= 0.701(80/88) + 0.161(70/80) + 0.06 EP(65/80) 
(7.30)*** (0.16)* (0.52) 
df = 55; R2(adj) = 0.481; F = 18.93 
(4) GDP= 0.64 1(80/88) + 0.09 1(70/80) + 0.06 EP(65/80) + 0.24 EP(80/88) 
(6.82)*** (l.04) (0.66) (2.51 )** 
Pakistan 
India 
df = 54; R2(adj) = 0.526; F = 17.19 








Notes for tables on pa~es 160-162 
1. Applicable to tables 5-9: 
df =degrees of freedom; R2(adj) =adjusted coefficient of determination; F = F statistic; 
( ) = t statistic. GDP = average annual growth in gross domestic product, 198~8; 
1(80188) average annual growth in investment 1980188; EP(65!80) = average annual 
growth in energy production 1965-80; EP(80!88) = average annual increase in energy 
production 1980-88. 
*Significant at the 90 per cent level of confidence. 
**Significant at the 95 per cent level of confidence. 
***Significant at the 99 per cent level of confidence. 
Actual and predicted values computed from equation (4) . 
• 
2. Appllcabk to tables 6-9: 
Factor 2 score based on data in table 1 
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Table 6 
Developing countries: sources of growth, 1980-88 
standardised regression coefficients 
(1) GDP= 0.61 I(80/88) 
(4.65)*** 
Countries with Factor 2 > -1.5 
df = 36; R2(adj) = 0.358; F = 21.59 
(2) GDP= 0.61 I(80/88) + 0.34 I(70/80) 
(5.14)*** (2.91)** 
df= 35; R2(adj) = 0.468; F = 17.30 
(3) GDP= 0.61I(80/88)+0.36 I(70/80)-0.04 EP(65/80) 
(4.99)*** (2.88)** (--0.30) 
df = 34; R 2( adj) = 0.454; F = 11.26 
(4) GDP= 0.57 I(80/88) + 0.30 I(70/80)-0.03 EP(65/80) + 0.18 EP(80/88) 
(4.66)*** (2.43)** (--0.30) (l.43) 
df = 33; R2(adj) = 0.528; F = 9.23 









Developing countries: sources of growth, 1980-88 
standardised regression coefficients 
(1) GDP= 0.58 I(80/88) 
(4.14)*** 
Countries with Factor 2 > -1.0 
df = 33; R2(adj) = 0.321; F = 17.12 
(2) GDP = 0.62 I(80/88) + 0.36 I(70/80) 
(4.87)*** (2.85)** 
df = 32; R2(adj) = 0.442; F = 14.49 
(3) GDP= 0.61 I(80/88) + 0.39 I(70/80)- 0.08 EP(65/80) 
(4.68)*** (2.88)** (--0.61) 
df = 31; R2(adj) = 0.431; F = 9.60 
(4) GDP= 0.58 I(80/88) + 0.34 I(70/80) + 0.08 EP(65/80) + 0.19 EP(80/88) 
(4.46)*** . (2.48)** (--0.60) (1.46) 
df = 30; R2(adj) = 0.450; F = 8.00 
Actual versus predicted growth rates 
Actulll Predicted 
Pakistan 6.5 2.2 
India 5.2 1.3 
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Table 8 
Developing countries: sources of growth, 1980-88 
standardised regression coefficients 
(1) GDP= 0.511(80/88) 
(3.14)** 
Countries with Factor 2 > -0.5 
df = 38; R2(adj) = 0.234; F = 9.92 
(2) GDP= 0.50 1(80/88) + 0.49 1(70/80) 
(3. 71 )*** (3.61 )** 
df = 27; R2(adj) = 0.465; F = 13.63 
(3) GDP= 0.52 1(80/88) + 0.48 1(70/80) + 0.08 EP(65/80) 
(3. 71 )*** (3.46)** (0.55) 
df= 26; R2(adj) = 0.451; F = 8.95 
(4) GDP= 0.47 1(80/88) + 0.43 1(70/80) + 0.05 EP(65/80) + 0.22 EP(80/88). 
(3.40)*** (3.03)** (0.36) ( 1.53) 
df = 25; R2(adj) = 0.478; F = 7.64 









Developing countries: sources of growth, 1980-88 
standardised regression coefficients 
(1) GDP= 0.461(80/88) 
(2.34)** 
Countries with Factor 2 > 0 
df = 19; R2(adj) = 0.218; F = 5.32 
(2) GDP = 0.54 1(80/88) + 0.53 1(70/80) 
(3.19)** (3.14)** 
df = 18; R2(adj) = 0.439; F = 8.82 
(3) GDP= 0.56 1(80/88) + 0.53 1(70/80) + 0.04 EP(65/80) 
(3.15)*** (3.06)** (0.51) 
df = 17; R2(adj) = 0.503; F = 5.73 
(4) GDP= 0.501(80/88) + 0.501(70/80) + 0.04 EP(65/80) + 0.22 EP(80/88) 
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(2.76)*** (2.89)** (0.23) (1.23) 
Pakistan 
India 
df= 16; R2(adj) = 0.431; F = 4.80 
Actual versus predicted growth rates 







In sum, comparative data does not provide much support for the idea that en-
ergy production (and presumably investment in energy) necessarily creates ex-
panded rates of growth. This is not to say, however, that some sectors may benefit 
appreciably from increased domestic sources of energy, but rather that the econ-
omy as a whole is better served by expanded capital formation in other areas. 
The impact of energy investment over time 
A critical question, that must ultimately be addressed, concerns the direction 
of causation: has investment in energy in Pakistan affected various aspects of the 
national economy or has energy investment simply responded to the needs gener-
ated by the rapid rate of economic expansion over the last few decades? In other 
words, before drawing any definitive conclusions as to the impact of the govern-
ment's large investment in energy-producing capacity, one must satisfactorily ad-
dress the issue of causation. Fortunately, several statistical tests using regression 
analysis for this purpose are gaining wider acceptance. The original and most 
widely used causality test was developed by Granger.12 According to this test, en-
ergy causes growth in GDP if growth can be predicted more accurately by past val-
ues of energy investment than by pa~t values of growth. To be certain that causality 
runs from energy to growth, past values of energy must also be more accurate than 
past values of growth at predicting energy expenditure. 
More formally, four cases are possible: 
(a) energy causes growth, when the prediction error for growth de-
creases when energy investment is included in the growth equation. 
In addition, when growth is added to the energy equation, the final 
prediction error should increase; 
(b) growth causes energy, when the prediction error for growth in-
creases when energy is added to the regression equation for 
growth, and is reduced when growth is added to the regression 
equation for energy; 
(c) feedback occurs, when the final prediction error decreases when de-
fence is added to the growth equation, and the final prediction error 
decreases when growth is added to the defence equation; and 
(d) no relationship exists, when the final prediction error increases both 
when defence .is added to the growth equation and when growth is 
added to the energy equation. 
Operational procedures 
The data for investment in energy usoo to carry out the causation tests were 
derived from those provided by the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund.13 For the best statistical results, 14 the variables were transformed into their 
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Table 10 
Pakistan: interaction of capital formation in energy and the economy, 
1972-90 
Optimal lag (years) Causation patterns Dominant 
Final prediction error ( ) A B c D pattern 
Gross domestic product 
Energy 2 2 4 l 
Investment (0.29E-3) (0.30E-3) (0.88E-l) (0.74E-l) GDP~ Energy(+w) 
Energy 2 l 4 l 
Infrastructure (0.29E-3) (0.33E-3) (0.81E-l) (0.70E-l) GDP~ Energy(+w) 
Private investment 
Energy 3 4 4 l 
Investment (0.26E-2) (0.19E-2) (0.89E-l) (0.77E-l) Feedback(+m,+w) 
Energy 3 3 4 l 
Infrastructure (0.26E-2) (0.15E-2) (0.SIE-1) (0.73E-l) Feedback( +m,+w) 
Total investment 
Energy 3 4· 4 2 
Investment (0.24E-l) (0.87E-2) (0.88E-l) (0.59E-l) Feedback( +m,+w) 
Energy 3 4 4 4 
Infrastructure (0.24E-l) (0.20E-l) (0.81E-l) (0.67E-l) Feedback(+m,+w) 
Notes: Summary of results obtained from Granger Causality Tests. A Hsaio Procedure was incorporated to deter· 
mine the optimal lag. Regression patterns: A =private on private; B =public on private; C =public on pub· 
lie; D =private on public. The dominant pallern is that with the lowest final prediction error. The signs ( +.-) 
represent the direction of impact. In the case of feedback. the two signs represent the lowest final prediction 
error of relationships Band D. Each of the variables was regressed with 1, 2, 3 and 4-year lags. Strength as-
sessment (s =strong; m =moderate; w =weak) based on the size of the standardised regression coefficient 
and I-test of statistical significance. ' 
annual rate of growth. Unfortunately, the government of Pakistan does not publish 
data on the stock of, and increments to, the country's energy infrastructure. How-
ever, following the procedure of Blejer and Khan,15 it is possible to approximate 
increments to the nation's energy infrastructural base. The basic assumption under-
lying these proxies is that infrastructure investment is an on-going process, which 
moves slowly over time and cannot be changed very rapidly. 
The first of the two approaches takes the trend level of real public sector in-
vestment as representing the long-term, or infrastructural, component. A second 
approach is to make the distinction between types of public investment, on the 
basis of whether the investment is expected. Again, it is assumed that expected 
(anticipated) public investment is closer to the long-term, or infrastructural, com-
ponent. If deterioration is occurring in the country's stock of infrastructure, this 
measure may be a more accurate proxy than that obtained using the trend method. 
It is the measure adopted in the analysis below. 
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Relationships between energy expenditure and the economy were considered 
valid if they were statistically significant at the 95 per cent level of confidence. 
That is, if 95 per cent of the time we could conclude that they had not occurred by 
pure chance, we considered them statistically significant. 
Finally, there is no theoretical reason to believe that the links between infra-
structure and the economy have a set lag relationship - that is, they impact on one 
another over a fixed time period. The period could be short-run, involving largely 
the spin-off from construction, or longer-term, as either term expands from the 
stimulus provided by the other. To find the optimal adjustment period of impact, 
lag structures of up to six years were estimated. The lag structure with the highest 
level of statistical significance was the one chosen to best depict the relationship 
under consideration (the optimal lag reported in tables 9 and 10). 
Results 
The results for gross domestic product, and private and total in\Testment 
(table 10) indicate the direction of causation, together with the optimal lag time. 
Strength assessments reflect the magnitude of the impact (in terms of constant 
price, local currency units) and the statistical significance of the relationship. Sev-
eral patterns are of interest. 
1. Energy investment (and infrastructure) have responded to the needs 
created by expanded GDP, rather than stimulating or initiating in-
creases in growth. In addition, despite the fairly rapid increase in 
energy investment in recent years, this response has been rather 
weak. 
2. Energy investment and infrastructure are much more closely re-
lated to private investment than growth. In general, energy pro-
vides a fairly strong stimulus to private investment (over a four-
year period). In tum, private investment provides a weak stimulus 
(with a year lag) to expanded energy production. That is, the gov-
ernment seems to respond fairly weakly, but quickly, to the needs 
created by expanded private investment. 
3. Generally, the same patterns for private investment hold for total 
(private plus public) investment. However, the feedback lags from 
investment to energy investment are slightly longer than those as-
sociated with private investment. 
Conclusion 
While not denying the importance of investment in the energy sector in Pa-
kistan, the above analysis casts doubt on tlfe argument that, in the period up to 
1990, energy had been a major factor constraining the expansion of the Pakistani 
economy. There is little evidence that the overall economic growth of the country 
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had been stimulated by the expansion in energy that took place during the previous 
decade and a half. However, this pattern may be changing. Pasha'sl6 findings sug-
gest that, towards the end of the 1980s, power outages reduced GDP by about 1.8 
per cent. If true, this fact, together with the finding of a positive linkage from en-
ergy to private investment, is sufficient to justify accelerating the country's invest-
ment in energy capacity. This conclusion is reinforced by the government's shift in 
recent years towards relying on private investment (as opposed to public invest-
ment) as a major source of economic growth.17 
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